Freaky example! Do you think that voting for self-interest is really just as scary as voting because you want to see a nation destroyed? Is self-interest really in that category at all? Your example goes beyond “without adequate justification,” I think . . . I might reconsider the example to make sure that too much of the rhetorical appeal of the argument doesn’t rest on the emotional impact of the scary Zeke figure. It might be worth considering whether self-interest really can be incorporated within the category of “a wrong” at all. My sense is that many people have not attended deeply *enough* to their own interests. Much of progressive political mobilization is about asking people to attend to their own interests. Jane Mansbridge has some work on the role of deliberative democracy in helping people to clarify their interests, and on the value of that clarification from a deliberative point of view.

I think this is especially important when you are talking about oppressed groups who are frequently exorted to sacrifice on behalf of the common interest. The very concept of self-interest might have quite different political resonance depending on where you are situated in relationship to the larger community. For elites we largely assume the system is working in their interests and so further efforts to nakedly advance their (our) own interests look suspect . . for people for whom no such suspicion can be warranted, a theory saying “don’t vote on the basis of your interests, and if that’s the only thing you really think you know anything about, then I’m here to tell you not to vote at all” can be a quite harmful replication of alienating disempowerment. It seems like the nature/content of the interest is also relevant. I guess I’m suspicious of your suspicion of self-interest. . . . interesting book though!

Thanks for the your questions. (Thanks to Aaron, too.) My take on it is that voting the right way isn’t good enough. You need to be adequately justified in thinking you are voting the right way. So, suppose Obama was in fact the best candidate. But suppose Zeke voted for Obama b/c Zeke believes Obama will destroy America, and Zeke would like to see America destroyed. In chapter 3, I argue that Zeke is doing something wrong. It’s not that he’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason, but that he’s doing the wrong thing by voting without adequate justification.

I’m still working out what the theory means for 2-party systems, and when it’s appropriate to vote for the lesser of two evils, etc.

I guess I also wonder about this argument in a 2-party system. Usually you’re voting for one of two parties. What does it mean to “vote for the common interest” in that context? Neither party is going to be a straightforward defender of “the common interest”– both parties have lots of problems and so on– so I am wondering how fine-tuned of a judgment this can be.

In general partisanship seems like the huge lurking question here — hard to talk about voting without talking about the larger system within which voting takes place– and I would urge you not to write a theory of voting that ignores partisanship.

Sounds like a neat project!

I guess one classic and problematic question not on your list is the issue of who should get to vote and why. Although this is not your focus it may be the case that answers to why someone has a right to vote in the first place will be relevant to answering what is and is not an ethical way of exercising that right.