Comments on: Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (Chapter 5, Impartiality and Objectivity) http://publicreason.net/2010/03/29/sen-%e2%80%98the-idea-of-justice%e2%80%99-chapter-5-impartiality-and-objectivity/ a blog for political philosophers Wed, 08 Feb 2012 23:18:32 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.3.1 By: Blain Neufeld http://publicreason.net/2010/03/29/sen-%e2%80%98the-idea-of-justice%e2%80%99-chapter-5-impartiality-and-objectivity/#comment-1226 Blain Neufeld Mon, 12 Apr 2010 14:06:19 +0000 http://publicreason.net/2010/03/29/sen-%e2%80%98the-idea-of-justice%e2%80%99-chapter-5-impartiality-and-objectivity/#comment-1226 You raise some interesting points on a very brief (and somewhat sketchy) chapter, Derek. My apologies for not replying earlier. Regarding: <blockquote>Burke’s argument from the wisdom of tradition is just as ‘objective’ as Wollstonecraft’s liberty principle. Yet, as her argument shows, they are irreconcilable. What place will each of these concerns have in Sen’s social choice function? </blockquote> In cases of such conflicts, I think that Sen would recommend employing Smith's device of the 'impartial spectator' in order to adjudicate amongst competing, incompatible claims concerning justice (i.e., perhaps the impartial spectator helps determine <em>which</em> interests, values, views, etc., are to be incorporated into "Sen's social choice function"?). More generally, I think that the impartial spectator device <em>might</em> provide a means for Sen to resist the charge (which Chris leveled in his comment on Ch 4, and with which I agreed) that his view is 'political in the wrong way'. You raise some interesting points on a very brief (and somewhat sketchy) chapter, Derek. My apologies for not replying earlier.

Regarding:

Burke’s argument from the wisdom of tradition is just as ‘objective’ as Wollstonecraft’s liberty principle. Yet, as her argument shows, they are irreconcilable. What place will each of these concerns have in Sen’s social choice function?

In cases of such conflicts, I think that Sen would recommend employing Smith’s device of the ‘impartial spectator’ in order to adjudicate amongst competing, incompatible claims concerning justice (i.e., perhaps the impartial spectator helps determine which interests, values, views, etc., are to be incorporated into “Sen’s social choice function”?).

More generally, I think that the impartial spectator device might provide a means for Sen to resist the charge (which Chris leveled in his comment on Ch 4, and with which I agreed) that his view is ‘political in the wrong way’.

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