Comments on: Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’, Chapter 13, ‘Happiness, Well-being, and Capabilities’ http://publicreason.net/2010/05/24/sen-the-idea-of-justice-chapter-13-happiness-well-being-and-capabilities/ a blog for political philosophers Wed, 08 Feb 2012 23:10:58 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.3.1 By: Cynthia Stark http://publicreason.net/2010/05/24/sen-the-idea-of-justice-chapter-13-happiness-well-being-and-capabilities/#comment-1251 Cynthia Stark Mon, 14 Jun 2010 14:27:11 +0000 http://publicreason.net/2010/05/24/sen-the-idea-of-justice-chapter-13-happiness-well-being-and-capabilities/#comment-1251 I agree that Sen's claim that duties are grounded in our effective power to make a difference is frustratingly underdeveloped. Some guidance to what he has in mind is given by the fact that he contrasts this approach to grounding duties to the social contract approach. He says, "if someone has the power to make a difference that he or she can see will reduce injustice in the world, then there is a strong and reasoned argument for doing just that (without having to dress all this up in terms of some imagined prudential advantage in a hypothetical exercise of cooperation.) I don't see why a social contract theorist could not incorporate Sen's suggestion--the contract device is typically used to justify very general principles of justice that govern institutions and is an exercise of ideal theory. This seems compatible with the idea that individuals living under those institutions, who are able, are bound to eradicate injustice where it arises. The nature of these obligations would be a matter for non-ideal theory. I agree that Sen’s claim that duties are grounded in our effective power to make a difference is frustratingly underdeveloped. Some guidance to what he has in mind is given by the fact that he contrasts this approach to grounding duties to the social contract approach. He says, “if someone has the power to make a difference that he or she can see will reduce injustice in the world, then there is a strong and reasoned argument for doing just that (without having to dress all this up in terms of some imagined prudential advantage in a hypothetical exercise of cooperation.)

I don’t see why a social contract theorist could not incorporate Sen’s suggestion–the contract device is typically used to justify very general principles of justice that govern institutions and is an exercise of ideal theory. This seems compatible with the idea that individuals living under those institutions, who are able, are bound to eradicate injustice where it arises. The nature of these obligations would be a matter for non-ideal theory.

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